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INTRODUCTION 
 
Welcome to the first Trust Economics workshop, which discusses techniques, 
methods and tools for security decision making, taking into account economic, 
business and organisational concerns, human factors and information security 
technology (in a 'whole-system' view). 
 
As a motivating example, enterprises and government face increasingly difficult and 
important security decisions related to privacy and confidentiality of data of 
customers and citizens.  How can we improve the decision making in such situations? 
What weaknesses exist in the state of the art? What information do we need? Which 
mathematical methods and software tools can make a difference? 
 
The workshop has an interesting programme, with a main aim of initiating discussions 
on fundamentally new methods of security decision making grounded in sound 
mathematical tools that utilise a deep understanding of business, human and 
technological aspects. The papers in this technical report are internal publications that 
will not prohibit publication elsewhere. 
 
We are greatful for the support of the UK Technology Strategy Board for the Trust 
Economics project.  This workshop was organised and supported by the project 
partners: Hewlett-Packard, Merrill Lynch, University of Bath, University College 
London and Newcastle University and by University of Aberdeen. We especially 
thank the invited and keynote speakers Ann Cavoukian and Cliff Jones for their 
enthusiastic participation and we hope you enjoy participating in this workshop. 
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PROGRAMME 
 
 
10:30 Registration and coffee 
 
11:00 Welcome and opening 
 
11:15 Invited Presentation 
 
Ann Cavoukian, Information & Privacy Commissioner of Ontario 
 
“Privacy by Design Overcomes Negative Externalities Arising from Poor 
Management of Personal Information” 
 
12:00 Lunch 
 
1:00 Keynote 
 
Cliff Jones, Newcastle University 
 
“Formal Methods in Interdisciplinary Research” 
 
2:00     Technical Session 
 
A. Baldwin, M. Casassa Mont, D. Pym and S. Shiu  
 
“Systems Modelling for Economic Analysis of Security Investments: A Case Study 
in Identity and Access Management” 
 
R. Thomas 
 
“Total Cost of Security—A Method for Managing Risks and Incentives Across the 
Extended Enterprise” 
 
 B. Grawemeyer and H. Johnson 
 
“How Secure is your Password? Towards Modelling Human Password Creation” 
 
3:30 Coffee 
 
4:00   Panel 
 
“Future Directions for the Economics of Information Security” 
 
5:00 Close 
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INVITED PRESENTATION 
 
Ann Cavoukian, Information & Privacy Commissioner of Ontario 
“Privacy by Design Overcomes Negative Externalities Arising from Poor 
Management of Personal Information” 
 
Abstract 
“Poor management of personal information often results in unintended consequences, 
or negative externalities. For data-rich organizations, public or private, these can 
include inefficient operations, fines, penalties and other remedial costs, diminished 
confidence and trust of customers, partners and other clients, and lost business and 
competitiveness. From the individual's point of view, these externalities can include 
lost dignity, loss of control and discrimination, identity fraud and theft, or worse. Poor 
information accountability impacts everyone, and can result in socially sub-optimal 
outcomes. In today's opaque Web 2.0 world of ubiquitous, networked data 
availability, the problem of negative externalities will undoubtedly grow. Come hear 
Dr. Cavoukian explain how applying her "Privacy by Design" principles in a 
comprehensive manner to information systems and architectures can transform zero-
sum scenarios into positive-sum, win-win outcomes - benefitting both individuals and 
organizations.” 
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Systems Modelling for Economic Analyses of Security
Investments: A Case Study in Identity and Access
Management
Adrian Baldwin Marco Casassa Mont David Pym Simon Shiu
HP Labs, Bristol
England, U.K.
Abstract
Identity and Access Management (IAM) is a key issue for systems security managers such
as CISOs. More specifically, it is a difficult problem to understand how different investments
in people, process, and technology affect the intended security outcomes. We position this
problem within the framework of optimal control models in macroeconomics, and use a process
model to understand the dynamics of the utility of possible trade-offs between investment,
access, and security incidents (breaches). A utility function is used to express the security
manager’s IAM preferences, and the functional behaviour of its components is described via
a process model. Executing our process model as Monte Carlo simulations, we illustrate the
behaviour of the utility function for varying levels of investment and threat, and so provide
the beginnings of a decision-support tool for systems security managers.
1 Introduction
Since CISOs have finite budgets, security investment strategy involves choices between risks and
outcomes. Moreover, many of the outcomes and choices are intuitively correlated; that is, they
trade off against one other. We are interested in how to help stakeholders (decision makers) better
understand these trade-offs, and how to form a better-shared understanding of their preferences.
In this macro-economic style modelling approach, following the style outlined in [2] we can
identify the components and preferences between them through utility functions such as:
U(C,A,K, t) = w1(C − C¯)2 + w2(A− A¯)2 + w3(K − K¯)2 (1)
in which C, A, and K and C¯, A¯, and K¯ represent, respectively, the actual and target levels of
confidentiality, availability and investment, and wis represent the appropriate weightings; t denotes
time. Thus the utility function is a weighted function of the deviations from target the three
economic magnitudes whose mutual trade-off is of interest to us, with the weights expressing the
decision-maker’s preferences among the magnitudes. It should be noted that the quadratic form of
the utility function is not the only choice available. It is, however, a convenient first step, derived
from the basics of utility theory and portfolio theory, and provides a simple account of diminishing
marginal utility. Richer choices are available, such as the asymmetric Linex functions employed
in the work of Barro and Gordon [1], Nobay and Peel [8], and Ruge-Murcia [9]. Asymmetries in
the components the utility function — in contrast to the symmetric form of the quadratic case —
express the extent to which the security manager is relative more or less concerned about deviating
above or below target.
The general setting for optimal control models is given in [6]. Having set up such an account of
utility, our objective is to maximize it over the space of control variables which govern its dynamics
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over time.1 That is, the security strategy problem for a given organization is expressed as a utility
maximization problem with respect to the organization’s preferences.
The dynamics of C, A, and K is explored through appropriately constructed system equations
in [7]. In line with previous work by some of us and others [3, 2], however, this paper describes
how to use a systems modelling approach to explore the components of interest. Systems models
are intended to directly capture and represent (potentially multiple) stakeholders comprehension
of a system, as such we believe they represent a more meaningful and trusted exploration of the
utility components.
In the work presented in this paper, which analyzes trade-offs between security incidents, access,
and investment in identity and access management, we do not have a set of system equations for
the magnitudes that are of interest to us. Rather, we have a process model: an executable
mathematical model of the system in which we are interested that is based on mathematical
concepts of environment, location, resource, and process. The process model, when executed as a
discrete-event simulation, produces as output numerical and graphical representations of incidents
and access in a given investment context. Thus we can illustrate the desired utility function (see
Section 3) in this case. Establishing an analytic connection between process models and the system
equations required to drive utility maximization, as described above, is a topic for further research.
Nevertheless, the illustrations of the utility function of interest that we are able to obtain prove
to be a valuable guide in information security investment decision making for IAM.
IAM is a complex ‘people, process, and technology’ problem. It challenges CISOs on how to
authenticate and authorize users; whether to centralize and automate processes (such as provi-
sioning); and how to influence and reflect reliance on application and infrastructure security. With
risks such as segregation of duties (SoD) IAM is also directly related to business level security and
productivity concerns and so is a rich and relevant example for studying security strategy.
In our case study, we use a systems modelling approach to construct a mathematical model
of a typical IAM system that can be tailored to fit different business and threat environments.
We assume two investment instruments: configuration which covers provisioning and SoD, and
enforcement which covers authentication, authorization, and general infrastructure and application
security. We use Monte Carlo-style simulation to show the effect different investment choices
will have on the predicted state of the system, and the predicted protection provided against
different threat scenarios. Predictive modelling represents explicitly the causal dependencies within
deployed security and IAM processes and provides a way to contextualise and calculate the metrics
we then use for estimating the utility function.
2 The IAM Systems Model
Our previous security models [3, 10] have been written and run using the Demos2k [5] toolkit.
In parallel with these studies, we have been designing and building a new tool chain, Gnosis —
which captures the mathematical theory presented in [4], where a prototype implementation is
also discussed — for executing the process models, its associated experiment manager, GXM, to
manage the execution of Gnosis models as Monte Carlo simulations and to support the data and
statistical analysis. The case study described here has been implemented and run using Gnosis.
Separate work will describe the advantages and implications of the Gnosis tool-set. The description
of the model provided should enable the reader to reconstruct an equivalent study using Demos2k.
The modelling idiom within which we work decomposes systems into four key conceptual facets:
the collection of processes that characterize the behaviour of the system, the resources that are
manipulated by the processes as they execute. and the locations around which the system is
distributed, logically or spatially; finally, we consider the environment, described stochastically,
within which the system exists. This idiom is supported mathematically by the work presented in
[4] and is also discussed in [10].
1Alternatively, we may consider a loss (the opposite of utility) function and seek to minimize it.
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2.1 Basic Structure of the Model
We construct a model with 2 investment instruments (control variables), one to set the level of
investment on access configuration, and one to set the level of investment on enforcing this config-
uration. The investment of each ranges between 1-10, providing 100 different experimental runs,
with (1,1) representing minimal investment in both instruments, and (10,10) the maximum. We
also have the ability to vary the threat environment, although for the purposes of this study, we
limited ourselves to two scenarios, one ‘mild’ and another ‘full’ which assumes many more internal
and external ‘attacks’. There are no assertions about the cost of moving the configuration instru-
ment from, say 5 to 6, or of whether an investment of 4 is equivalent to a typical investment in
enforcement. At this stage, the aim of the model is to explore the kinds of situations when dimin-
ishing returns are reached on a particular investment instrument, and to differentiate strategies
based on assumptions about the threat environment.
The basic components of the model are a series of externalities that trigger IAM relevant
processes, and each of the processes are affecting aspects of configuration and security state that
we are interested in tracking.
Each of the processes models the effect these processes have on the IAM state. For example, new
starters, staff leaving, job and organizational changes, introduction and retirement of applications,
and applying automation to provisioning for an application all affect the configuration state, and so
are included in the model. Similarly, application introduction, upgrade, retirement and migration
projects each affect the overall enforcement state and so are included in the model.
We are interested only in the effect each of the processes has on the state, and so each of the
processes are only defined in these terms. For example, this means the ‘new starter’ process does
not capture any of the steps in the provisioning workflow; instead it simply records the expected
side effect this process has on the access configuration. Moving the configuration instrument
changes the assumed effect this process has each time it runs.
In parallel with the IAM processes are a series of threat processes such as internal fraud
attempts, external hack attempts, former staff accessing application, and so on. These processes
are also triggered by externalities. We assume more attacks will be thwarted by a good IAM state,
and this is reflected in the way threat processes are modelled. Essentially, a good configuration
and enforcement state will lower the chances that a threat process will succeed.
In the executable model, each of the processes are spawned in parallel, and relevant probability
distributions are randomly sampled to determine when the external triggers fire and cause an
instance of a process to run. Each of these affects the state models (configuration, enforcement
and incidents) which we can sample to build a picture of what is going on.
There is not sufficient space to describe the model indetail, but, loosely, the investment instru-
ments adjust the way each process affects relevant state. For example, if there is heavy investment
in configuration then we expect the configuration state to be better than if there is little invest-
ment.
The architecture of the model is summarized in Figure 1
3 Simulation Results
Experiments exploring the states reached for each combination of the instrument for a ‘benign
threat environment (i.e., threat instruments all set low), and one ‘high-risk environment (i.e.,
where the threat instruments all set high) have been performed. Each execution simulates a year
of IAM activity, and we report the state recorded at the end of the year. The model was executed
100 times for each setting of the instruments, which is sufficient to bring the standard error to
acceptable levels. Since there are 10×10 instrument combinations, the total number of executions
for the two experiments was 20,000.
For each setting of the instruments we derived the expected number of breaches and business
access, where
BusinessAccess = 1000× (nonaccess(cross))/(nonaccess(cross) + access(tick)) (2)
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Figure 1: Basic Components of the IAM Model
For each setting of the instruments, we derive the expected number of incidents/breaches (IC)
and denied business accesses (A), where
IC = number-external-attacks-incidents + number-internal-attacks-incidents + number-ex-
workers-attacks-incidents
A = 1000× (nonaccess(cross))/(nonaccess(cross) + access(tick) (3)
The number of breaches/incidents (IC) is determined by modelling internal, external and ex-
workers’ attacks and the likelihood of success based on investments in ‘enforcement’. A is calcu-
lated by taking into account the proportion of ‘denied accesses’ to legitimate business users from
the overall number of accesses.
More empirical work is required to establish an appropriate cost function for the investment
Instruments (K), but to show how this could proceed we set the cost function as
K = 50 + 2x + 1.8y (4)
where x represents the enforcement instrument, and y the configuration instrument. The (simple)
intent here is to capture the exponential cost of achieving more with enforcement or configuration.
The constant value represents the fact that there will be operational costs associated with these
activities even if there is zero emphasis placed on them.
When these results are graphed they show (fitting with intuition) that it makes no sense to
under-invest in either instrument as the breaches will be too large, but conversely also shows that
over-inesting will be punished (by the prohibitive cost). It is also interesting to explore the various
points of diminishing returns, e.g. when it makes no sense to invest in configuration, without first
investing in enforcement.
4 Discussion
Equation 1, in the introduction, describes the utility of a generic dynamic model illustrating the
chosen desired trade-off between confidentiality, availability, and investment. Figure 2 expresses
the effect of IAM choices as the aggregated weight between incidents, access, and investment
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Figure 2: Iso-investments with iso-utilities
plotted against investments in configuration and enforcement. The corresponding dynamic utility
model would be
U(C,A,K, t) = w1(IC − ¯IC)2 + w2(A− A¯)2 + w3(K − K¯)2 (5)
where IC, P , K and ¯IC, P¯ , K¯ represent, respectively, the actual and target levels of incidents,
access and investment, and the wis express the weighted preferences given to variance from each of
the targets; t is time. Here the targets represent levels of the given quantities that are acceptable
to the security manager in the context of the organizational priorities and policies. Generally, the
aim of such policies is to minimize disruption of the business process whilst maintaining acceptable
levels of security and cost.
More generally, each of the assumptions in the construction of the model, and each of the
relationships explored through simulation, are approximating the actual relationships between
¯IC, A¯, and K¯, the incident count, productivity, and investment parameters in Equation 5. For
example, the illustration that there are clear points where investing in one is severely handicapped
without investment in the other, directly feeds the way we assume K¯ affects both ¯IC and A¯.
We intend to continue to use the systems model of the IAM strategy, to guide parameterization
of the dynamic model, and to explore further the relationship and role of these two styles of model
based decision support.
Acknowledgements. We are grateful to Christos Ioannidis, Julian Williams, Brian Monahan,
and Matthew Collinson for their advice on various aspects of this work.
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ABSTRACT 
This is an extended abstract of the presentation of the same title 
for the Trust Economics Workshop, 2009. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
K.6.0 [Management of Computing and Information Systems]:  
General – Economics.  
General Terms 
Management, Measurement, Economics, Security, Theory. 
Keywords 
Information Risk Management, Cyber Security, Total Cost of 
Security, Loss Distribution Approach 
1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the main challenges facing information technology (IT) 
managers and business executives is how to map security metrics 
and performance to business metrics and performance.  This is 
necessary to align business goals and investments with security 
requirements, and to balance risks against costs and rewards. Lack 
of such metrics has resulted in a persistent disconnection between 
business decision-makers and security specialists regarding value 
and risk of information security [1].   
Because the benefits of security are the avoidance of uncertain 
losses, applying traditional cash flow return on investment (ROI) 
techniques would be inappropriate, confusing, or misleading. 
Even variations tailored for security (e.g. Return on Security 
Investment, ROSI [3]) have fundamental problems.  Furthermore, 
the domain is rife with unruly uncertainty (i.e. ambiguity, 
incomplete information, contradictory information, intractability, 
unknown-unknowns, etc.) which makes it difficult or impossible 
to reliably estimate annualized loss expectation (ALE) or other 
probabilistic estimates of expected losses.  
As a solution, I propose a managerial accounting framework 
called “Total Cost of Security”.  (The name alludes to the Total 
Quality Management and the concept of “Total Cost of Quality”.) 
The proposed method has the following advantages over previous 
methods: 
• It is compatible with both Generally Accepted 
Accounting Practices (GAAP) and modern ERP 
software packages. 
• It is compatible with enterprise risk management 
(ERM) frameworks. 
• It is compatible with economic theories of the firm and 
rational decision-making with uncertain and incomplete 
information.  
• It provides a general framework for integrating a 
variety of “ground truth” security metrics into an 
economically meaningful composite measure. 
• It significantly reduces the data collection burden 
compared to other approaches (e.g. ALE). 
• It makes the most of available information and avoids 
many of the problems of unruly uncertainty. 
• It is robust to changing threat, vulnerability, asset, and 
organization environments. 
• It supports a variety of incentive instruments for 
stakeholders to both manage risks better, minimize 
externalities, and to disclose relevant information. 
• It is composable, which allows modular analysis of 
complex organizations and networks both at a 
component level and at various levels of aggregation. 
• It can be extended to include related risks such as 
privacy, intellectual property protection, and digital 
rights. 
• It is applicable to a wide variety of organizations, 
including for-profit, not-for-profit, government, and 
military.  It scales well across organization size and 
structures, including networks of organizations. 
2. PREVIOUS METHODS 
There have been previous attempts to quantify the risks associated 
with information security including Return on Investment (ROI), 
Discounted Cash Flow (DCF), Return on Security Investment 
(ROSI), and Annualized Loss Expectancy (ALE) and variants.  
Each of these has severe or fatal limitations when applied to 
information security risk.  Only the ALE method is consistent 
from an economic perspective.  However, it is not widely 
implemented because of the difficulty of getting enough historical 
data to estimate probabilities of loss for each incident or loss type. 
There are other severe problems with the ALE method, including 
the lack of any way to account for the dependence structure 
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between incident types.  This leads to significant underestimation 
of “tail risk”.  
Given the difficulty of quantifying information security risk, 
many organizations and analysts rely on qualitative risk 
assessment methods, including the “Frequency vs. Severity” 3X3 
Qualitative Matrix (with “High-Medium-Low” values for each 
dimension).  These are easier to produce and are useful for 
informing some decisions, but they lack the power of quantitative 
risk measures.  In particular, it’s not easy to use them as a basis 
for incentive instruments and they don’t compose easily. 
3. REQUIREMENTS 
The requirements for a risk management framework were listed in 
Section 1, phrased in the form of “advantages”.  More technically, 
it needs to be based on coherent risk measures, with the properties 
of translation invariance, subadditivity, positive homogeneity, and 
monoticity [4]. 
In addition, there is the requirement to harmonize two perspective 
of economic risk.  The first perspective is that of the rational 
investor who is focused on short-term returns, and volatility of 
returns.  Performance is defined as return on investment, and it is 
determined by the “fat of the curve” characterized by the mean 
and variance of return distributions.   
The second perspective is the insurance actuary who is focused 
on long-term funding of a pool of risks.  Performance is defined 
as avoiding “ruin” (i.e. paying out more in claims than you take in 
as premiums), and is determined by the “tail of the curve” 
characterized by parameters that quantify the thickness of the 
probability distribution at extreme values.   
Unlike previous methods, the Total Cost of Security framework 
harmonizes these two perspectives on economic risk to support 
rational decision-making and incentive instruments. 
4. TOTAL COST OF SECURITY 
FRAMEWORK 
This framework is based on the Loss Distribution Approach 
(LDA) that has become common in Enterprise Risk Management 
(ERM), pioneered in the financial services industry.   The curve in 
Figure 1 is a forward-looking probability density function for total 
cost of security for a given period.   
 
Figure 1. Idealized Total Cost of Security  
Probability Distribution 
It’s a matter of policy what costs to include or exclude in Total 
Costs of Security.  The framework is intended to be broad and 
inclusive, and it can include: 
• Direct costs of information security (personnel, 
security-specific operating and capital expenses, 
professional services, security training and awareness 
programs, security measurement and management costs, 
etc.) 
• Indirect costs of information security, allocated 
proportionately (IT help desk, configuration 
management, patch management, etc.) 
• Direct costs of security breaches, intrusions, losses, and 
recovery (discovery, damage control, emergency 
response, system restoration, penalties and/or fines, etc.) 
• Indirect costs of security breaches, intrusions, losses, 
and recovery, including revenue impact, reputation 
damage, etc. 
Our first innovation is to divide security-related or cyber trust 
costs into three categories: “Budgeted”, “Self-insured”, and 
“Catastrophic” (Figure 1).   Basically, this approach divides the 
aggregate cost probability distribution into three sections. The fat 
part of the curve near the mean is "budgeted".  The tail section up 
to some threshold (95% or 99%) is "self-insured".  The very far 
end of the tail is "catastrophic". It’s all-inclusive in that any given 
incident type, vulnerability type, or threat type could contribute 
costs into any or all of these categories. 
• "Budgeted" region is the “fat” part of the curve that 
includes costs that are predictable and likely within the 
budget year.  This includes all direct spending on 
security, plus indirect costs, plus the expected value of 
all high frequency losses and some small mix of lower 
frequency losses.  It also includes the opportunity costs 
– business activities that are prevented or inhibited by 
security. 
• "Self-insured" region covers loss magnitudes are 
potentially big enough to bust the budget (i.e. material 
to quarterly earnings statements), or could get the firm 
on the front page of a national newspaper, or could even 
threaten the firm’s credit rating, but not necessarily 
threaten firm survival.  These losses are low probability, 
but not close to zero. 
• "Catastrophic" region covers the most extreme loss 
values that are very unlikely and/or very unpredictable, 
but could threaten firm survival or even more 
widespread systemic losses.  This includes most or all 
“doomsday” scenarios. 
Our second innovation is the treatment of indirect costs, 
especially indirect costs of security incidents.  We advocate a 
general method of valuation called “Expected Cost of Recovery” 
– the anticipated cost of restoring the information systems, data, 
business processes, and business relationships to their previous 
level of capability and performance.  This is more conservative 
and reliable than other measures which try to estimate the lost 
business value due to the security incidents, including decline in 
stock prices and other stakeholder value metrics. 
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5. TCoS Risk Measure 
The general formula for TCoS (short for Total Cost of Security, 
pronounced “TEE-koss”) is summarized by the following 
equation: 
TCoS = B + SI + C  , where     
• TCoS is the Total Cost of Security risk measure 
• B is the budgeted security costs and losses for the 
period (i.e. median costs, or within a margin of the 
median), 
• SI is the self-insurance premiums to cover low 
probability-high impact losses, and 
• C is the costs of business continuity to prepare for 
catastrophic scenarios, allocated according to 
information security causes and effects. 
In plain language, TCoS starts with expected spending on security 
and security-related costs (losses, etc.) that are reflected in an 
organization’s budget.  Then you add the cost of insurance 
premiums to cover losses low probability-high impact losses, but 
below the level of catastrophe.   (Nearly all organizations will 
carry this risk rather than transfer it, so we call it “self-
insurance”.)  Finally, you add in the cost of business continuity 
allocated to information security.  Once these three components 
are added, the result is a TCoS in current dollars for the next time 
period.  A stream of TCoS values over multiple periods can be 
treated like ordinary cash flows in the standard Discounted Cash 
Flow (DCF) method.  The discount rate, a critical parameter, is 
very easy to specify – it’s the firms weighted-average cost of 
capital, or in other contexts, the risk-free rate.  (In ordinary capital 
budgeting analysis, the discount rate in DCF is adjusted to match 
the riskiness of the project.  “Riskiness of the project” is a tortured 
concept in the information security context.) 
5.1 Decision Criteria 
The most general decision criterion can be simply stated: 
• “Minimize TCoS while meeting other business 
objectives” 
It’s also possible to integrate TCoS into ordinary return on 
investment calculations to get a risk-adjusted return for various 
business opportunities or investments (e.g. outsourcing a business 
function, implementing a new intellectual property licensing 
revenue model for on-line media, etc.) that have significant 
information security implications. 
In addition to this general decision criterion, TCoS can inform 
more complicated decisions and has well-defined methods of 
composition (i.e. combining TCoS measures from different 
organization units into a composite measure for the entire 
organization) using portfolio theory, and also risk budgeting 
(allocation and prioritization incentives and constraints to guide 
business unit managers).  Details are outside the scope of this 
presentation. 
5.2 Estimation Methods 
Of course, the success of this or any other risk measurement 
method depends on our ability to estimate the relevant probability 
distribution curves.  If no such method is feasible, either in theory 
or in practice, then the method should be rejected.  In the 
proposed Total Cost of Security framework, these are still open 
research questions.  In this presentation I propose a set of methods 
that seem feasible, or at least promising. 
(It’s important to note that the Total Cost of Security framework 
does not depend on any particular estimation or modeling 
method.)  
Rather than use a single estimation method for the whole curve 
(as in the DCF and ALE methods), I propose piece-wise 
approach.  The probability distribution is then assembled from the 
pieces.  Though each set of methods are different, they can draw 
from similar data: operational security metrics (a.k.a. “ground 
truth”), business process metrics, expert opinion, historical data of 
incidents and losses, estimates of asset value and other values at 
risk.  
• The “Budgeted” region would be estimated using fairly 
conventional cost-driver models (i.e. linear relationships 
between operational metrics and indirect or overhead 
costs, etc.) and data drawn from accounting information 
systems. 
• The “Self-insured” region would be modeled using rank 
order or order-of-magnitude approaches, possibly 
combining stochastic methods with inferential 
reasoning.   
• The “Catastrophic” region would be modeled using 
scenario analysis and ordinal or nominal scales.  Here, 
the precision of cost estimate is much less important 
than it’s the qualitative value to guide strategy and 
business continuity planning, for example. 
An illustrative example is given for estimating self-insurance 
costs of data breaches for a mid-sized retailer (13 million credit 
card records).  Source data could include statistics about the IT 
architecture and operations, security metrics, the company’s 
breach history, industry surveys and data breach databases, threat 
models, and business process models.  It may be possible to 
estimate the “Self-insured” region using methods such as 
Bayesian Networks, Delphi Method, Predictive Modeling, and 
Monte Carlo Simulation.  This is an open research question. 
Another illustrative example is given for how TCoS could be used 
to define incentive instruments in the extended enterprise for the 
same retailer, focusing on card payment processing.   
The incentive instruments do not need to be linked to the 
complete TCoS metric for each party.  Instead, contingent 
payments, pooling, and other incentives can be tied to thresholds 
and limits for TCoS or its components.  There will be 
opportunities for third parties to support incentive instruments, 
including risk rating agencies and insurance companies, using 
facilities such as parametric (indexed) insurance [5] and finite risk 
insurance. 
6. RESEARCH RESULTS 
Theoretical research on the Total Cost of Security framework and 
TCoS risk measure is in the very early stages.  We are working 
toward following theoretical results: 
1. Demonstrating that TCoS is a coherent risk measure 
2. Demonstrating that it is feasible to derive a stable, 
acceptable estimate of the “Budgeted” region of the 
Total Cost of Security distribution curve using cost 
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driver methods from Activity-Based Costing, plus a 
formal bargaining game for cost sharing among 
(competing) stakeholders. 
3. Proposing an approach to estimating of the “Self-
insured” region of the Total Cost of Security 
distribution curve using a pluralistic, competition 
between diverse models.  This method remains to be 
tested and validated. 
4. Using similar methods as #2, demonstrating a method to 
segment TCoS and it’s components into three 
subcomponents: “internally-driven”, “partner-driven”, 
and “externally-driven”.  These sub-components can 
serve as the basis for risk pooling, insurance, cap-and-
trade, or other incentive-based mechanisms 
7. DISCUSSION 
Of course, confidence in this whole proposal depends on 
empirical research and on whether available data sets can be used 
usefully to estimate TCoS.  Our claim at this stage of research is 
that the framework is promising and seems to be viable from a 
theoretical perspective. 
One of the advantages of the proposed Total Cost of Security 
framework is that it can incorporate any type of information 
security risk or, more broadly, cyber trust which includes privacy, 
intellectual property protection, and digital rights management.  
It is also flexible enough to handle a wide range of risk profiles.  
In cases where the Total Cost of Security distribution curve 
happens to be normal distribution with relatively modest variance, 
then it would all fall into the "budgeted" category, and thus could 
be managed using traditional budget and cash flow methods.  On 
the other hand, if the loss distribution has a "fat tail", then the 
three-part approach becomes very useful to distinguish between 
what we know with confidence and what we know with less 
confidence or don't know at all.  
The framework makes the most of existing information, aligns 
with decision-making processes, and avoids the problem of 
conflating reliable and unreliable estimates.  It draws on 
innovations from Enterprise Risk Management, Activity-based 
Costing, and qualitative reasoning. The approach is roughly 
analogous to the Total Cost of Quality concept that helped 
motivate the Total Quality Management movement.  In addition 
to helping with security cost and performance management, this 
approach highlights the importance of organization learning and 
discovery.   
Another advantage is that it is compatible with existing methods 
for enterprise investment and performance management, including 
“Risk-adjusted Return on Capital” (RAROC) in financial services 
and “Economic Value-added” (EVA) across various industries.  In 
essence, “self-insurance” adds to the capital required by a project 
or business unit.  Higher levels of information risk mean a larger 
“self-insurance” pool is required, which lowers return on capital, 
and vice versa. 
It may be possible to standardize these methods with industries 
and organization types to allow, for the first time, meaningful 
aggregation of cyber trust cost information to guide government 
policy and vendor product development decisions.  It would also 
allow meaningful public disclosure of cyber trust risks and risk 
tolerance in stakeholder reports and regulatory filings.   
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Abstract. There is a need to devise security policies that protect infor-
mation from unauthorised access, as well as being responsive to require-
ments regarding users’ authentication behaviour. This paper contributes
by investigating real-life password generation within the context of daily
life. It presents the results of an empirical study, where participants com-
pleted a password diary over seven days. Factors relevant for profiling
different user roles are identified. The paper focuses on a subgroup of
participants, undertaking the role of non-IT administrative support staff,
and investigates participants’ password generation behaviour. Results in-
dicate that users’ knowledge of information security influences how they
create passwords. Possible changes in security policies that address these
individual differences are discussed.
1 Introduction
Passwords support system security, but are vulnerable to attack. Thus, there is
a need for security policies in the creation of passwords. However, this can some-
times be counterproductive. Research on the effect of security policies upon user
behaviour [1] shows that certain policies, enforced to increase security, resulted
in less and not more security. For example, enforcement of frequent password
change might lead the user to write passwords down. Hence more effective secu-
rity policies are needed which not only help to ensure that passwords are resilient
to attacks, but also take into account user behaviour in relation to passwords.
Our research aims to investigate how people use passwords and authenticate
with respect to relevant services in their daily live and how to model human
authentication behaviour. A password diary study was conducted, intended to
provide a record of what happens in reality regarding individual users. This
paper aims to identify factors that are relevant for profiling different user roles.
It focuses on a subgroup of participants - non-IT administrative support staff -
for example, an undergraduate administrator or a finance secretary. The paper
looks at this group’s behaviour towards password generation. A high-level aim is
to integrate this work on modelling human authentication behaviour with work
on model-based design of password security (see for example, [2]).
2 Password diary study
The research aim is to investigate how people use passwords in their daily lives
and identify areas that would benefit from changes in either security policy
or user behaviour. The study aims to show the difference in attitude towards
passwords and authentication behaviour with regards to an individual’s role.
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Twenty two participants were recruited from the computer science depart-
ment at the University of Bath and HP labs in Bristol: 6 non-IT administrative
support staff, 4 researchers, 1 lecturer, 1 systems engineer, 7 PhD students and
3 MSc students (13 female/9 male).
Participants were asked to complete a password diary over a seven-day pe-
riod. The diary consisted of a form that included detailed questions about the
authentication process. After participants completed their password diary a de-
brief was conducted. Here, information about the passwords and their use were
recorded. The information gathered included details about: the service used for
authentication; participants’ perception of the security-sensitivity of the service;
the structure of the password; whether passwords were shared between services;
whether passwords were known by a third person; how the password was gen-
erated; participants’ estimated level of security of the password; how it was
remembered; how often it was used; and finally, how often it was changed. A
detailed description of the setup of the password diary study can be found in
[3].
3 Results
This paper looks at participants’ behaviour in password generation gathered
through the debrief session only. It focuses on a subgroup of participants the
non-IT administrative support staff (which, from here, we refer to as the ‘admin
support group’) - in order to identify factors that are relevant for profiling dif-
ferent user roles when modelling human authentication behaviour. A complete
analysis of the password diary study, which includes participants’ authentication
behaviour relating to different roles is given in [3].
3.1 Services
Overall, the admin support group (6 participants) reported 36 passwords, which
were used for authentication on certain services over the seven-day period (mean
=6, min=4, max=8, SD=1.41). Most of these services (42%) were related to
an authentication for a company internal service. This was followed by ser-
vices (30%), which enabled authentication for an external service (e.g. bank,
e-commerce). Finally, 28% of the authentications were logins to or unlocking a
computer/or domain.
3.2 Passwords
The passwords that the admin support group generated included: passwords
that contain a singe word (44%), a common word or name (20%), a variation on
a meaningful phrase (12%), a number pattern (9%), a meaningful phrase (6%),
some other meaningful pattern (6%), and randomly generated ones (3%). These
passwords were sometimes strengthened by either appending numeric suffix or
prefix (58%) or by replacing/inserting letters by symbols (22%).
3.3 Security perception on services and passwords
Most services (59%) which required password authentication were perceived to
be ‘very sensitive’. This was followed by services perceived as ‘fairly sensitive’,
23%; and ‘sensitive’, 18%.
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The passwords were rated mostly as ‘secure’ (hard to crack), 50%; ‘fairly
secure’, 23%; ‘highly secure’ (uncrackable), 12%; ‘not very secure’ (crackable),
12%; ‘insecure’ (easy to guess), 3%.
A bivariate correlation analysis between the security perception of the service
and the passwords revealed the following significant correlations:
– A significant negative correlation between a service perceived as very sensi-
tive and passwords perceived as fairly secure (r=-.50, p<.01).
– A significant positive correlation between a service perceived as fairly sensi-
tive and passwords perceived as fairly secure (r=.84, p<.01).
– A significant negative correlation between a service perceived as fairly sen-
sitive and passwords perceived as secure (r=-.51, p<.01).
– A significant positive correlation between a service perceived as not secure
and passwords perceived as insecure (r=.56, p<.01).
The results suggest that participants tried to match perceived security level
of the service to the estimated security level of their passwords, for example
matching a not very sensitive service with an insecure password, a fairly sensitive
service with a fairly secure password; and avoiding matching a very sensitive
service with only a fairly secure password.
Fig. 1. Estimated security level and password nature within admin support group
Looking into more detail at the admin support group participants’ passwords
and estimated security level, Figure 1 interestingly shows, that all of the pass-
words estimated as highly secure (uncrackable) and most of passwords regarded
as secure (hard to crack) are passwords that contain a single word. Additionally,
most of the passwords estimated as fairly secure are passwords that include a
common word or name. However, surprisingly, both these types of passwords
(single word and common word or name) are among those which are insecure
and easy to guess.
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The bivariate correlation analysis between participants’ estimated security
level and the nature of the passwords showed the following significant correla-
tions:
– A significant positive correlation between passwords perceived as highly se-
cure and passwords that contain a singe word (r=.41, p<.05).
– A significant negative correlation between passwords perceived as secure and
passwords that contain a common word or name (r=-.51, p<.01).
– A significant positive correlation between passwords perceived as fairly se-
cure and passwords that contain a common word or name (r=.58, p<.01).
– A significant positive correlation between passwords perceived as insecure
and passwords that entail a number pattern (r=.56, p<.01).
The results suggest that participants within the admin support group might
have misconceptions regarding the security level of passwords and their nature,
including the misconception that passwords which contain a single word are
highly secure, or that passwords that consists of a number pattern are insecure.
In fact, single word passwords are insecure and number pattern passwords are
secure.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
The results indicate that the admin support group tried to match the perceived
security level of the service to the estimated security level of the password.
However, there seems to be a misconception of the security level of passwords and
their nature. It appears that the admin support group has a lack of knowledge
about certain password cracking methods such as dictionary attacks that makes
a password that entails a single word insecure [4]. Security policies could help
to overcome such misconceptions by giving advice on how to generate secure
passwords, such as how to create a variation on a meaningful phrase and/or
highlight the security implications of insecure passwords.
The next step of this research is to use Task Knowledge Structures [5] to
model human authentication behaviour, including the activity of generating
passwords. These models can then be taken into account in the design of new
security policies able to protect information from unauthorized access, and be
responsive to individuals’ needs by assisting in overcoming security misconcep-
tions.
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